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Understanding Game Theory via Wireless
Power Control
Giacomo Bacci, Luca Sanguinetti, and Marco Luise
In this lecture note, we introduce the basic concepts of game theory (GT), a branch of mathematics tra-
ditionally studied and applied in the areas of economics, political science, and biology, which has emerged
in the last fifteen years as an effective framework for communications, networking, and signal processing
(SP). The real catalyzer has been the blooming of all issues related to distributed networks, in which the
nodes can be modeled as players in a game competing for system resources. Some relevant notions of GT
are introduced by elaborating on a simple application in the context of wireless communications, notably
the power control in an interference channel (IC) with two transmitters and two receivers.
RELEVANCE
Recently, the mathematical tools of GT [1] have attracted a significant interest by the wireless com-
munications and SP engineering communities [2, Part II], due to the need for designing autonomous,
distributed, and flexible systems, in which the available resources are allocated through low-complexity
and scalable procedures. Games are appealing, owing to some characteristics that are not common in
classical optimization: as an example, GT can handle interactive situations in which each player can only
have a partial control over the optimization variables, while using its own performance metric. It is true
that commonalities can be found with other disciplines, such as multi-objective optimization [3], convex
optimization [4], and learning theory [5], but GT possesses many distinguishing features that make it
essential for the standard current toolbox of communication as well as SP engineers.
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2PREREQUISITES
The readers require basic knowledge in linear algebra and wireless communication theory.
WHAT IS A GAME?
To take advantage of GT and its associated theoretical tools, the first step is to model the problem at hand
as a game. In doing so, three ingredients must be identified:
• the players, that represent the main actors in the problem, having conflicting interests and affecting the
performance of everyone else in the game;
• a set of strategies available to each player, that determines what each player can do;
• a utility function for each player, that measures its degree of satisfaction as a function of the combina-
tion of all player’s choices.
This description may encompass a large number of situations: to mention a few examples, players in a game
can be base stations (BSs) allocating the resources in a cellular network to increase the system throughput,
or watermarking devices choosing algorithms to face potential attackers.
The objective of the modeling effort is to describe the game using its strategic-form representation: a
triplet ⟨K, {Sk}k∈K, {uk}k∈K⟩, where: K = {1, . . . ,K} is the set of players, where K is the number
of players; Sk is the set of strategies for each player k; and uk(s) is the utility function (also known as
reward or payoff ) associated to player k for a combination of choices s = [s1, . . . , sK ] = [sk, s\k], where
s\k = [s1, . . . , sk−1, sk+1, . . . , sK ] denotes the strategies taken by all other players except player k (the
opponents).
In general, the game outcome uk(s) for player k depends on all players’ choices through s, that stems
out from the interaction of the players with possibly conflicting interests. This brings forth a couple of
distinguishing features of GT:
• each player k can have a different performance metric; this feature is captured by a per-player specific
function uk(s), that accounts for the player’s nature;
• each player k has partial control (sk ∈ Sk only) over the optimization variables.
The first property is strictly tied with multi-objective optimization [3], although a clear difference exists
in the scope of the optimization variables, as in multi-objective optimization we have full control over
the variables. The second property is tightly related to the framework of distributed optimization [4], with
which it shares many intersections, although there are specific differences: one of the most important is
that, while in distributed optimization the agents follow some common given rules, in GT the players act as
independent decision-makers.
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Fig. 1: Representation of the NFE game.
THE NEAR-FAR EFFECT (NFE) GAME
To picture out the meaning of the strategic-form representation, let us consider an example taken from a
very common wireless communications scenario: the IC, represented in Fig. 1a, in which the two transmit-
ters interfere with each other in the attempt to reach their own receiver. This simple scheme encompasses
many scenarios: it can be used to model i) a multicellular system, with red and blue nodes belonging to
two different cells; ii) a heterogeneous network, where the red and blue nodes belong to a macro cell and
a small cell, resp.; iii) a cognitive radio system, where the red and blue nodes are primary users (PUs) and
secondary users (SUs), resp.; and iv) a device-to-device system, where the receivers are also network nodes.
Using GT, we can i) model the problem at hand in a suitable manner, and ii) provide the theoretical tools
to solve it. In this case, solving means devising the optimal transmission strategy to be selected by the two
wireless terminals of Fig. 1a. In particular, we assume that the two nodes are allowed either to transmit at
a certain power level p, or to stay idle. This situation can be modeled as a game, with K = 2 players, and
strategy sets Sk = {0, p} for k ∈ K = {1, 2}. For simplicity, we also assume that the two terminals choose
their strategies simultaneously (i.e., without being informed of the other’s choice) once and for all (i.e., they
cannot make any change after observing the outcome of the game) – in GT parlance, we consider a static
game. Finally, since players and strategy sets are both countable, the game is finite.
As depicted in Fig. 1a, player 1 (the far terminal) is located much farther away from both receivers than
player 2 (the near terminal). To describe this situation in a mathematical fashion, we introduce the power
gains hjk ∈ R+ experienced by terminal k’s signal when propagating to receiver j. For simplicity, let us
assume hjk = hk for j = 1, 2 with h1/h2 ≪ 1 (we will better quantify this ratio later on), thereby giving
rise to the so-called near-far problem.
We need now to define a utility function, and to do so we consider that each terminal achieves a degree
4of satisfaction that depends both on the success of its transmission and on the energy spent to transmit at
power sk. Mathematically, this translates here into a (dimensionless) utility uk(s) = tk(s) − ck(s), where
tk(s) accounts for the outcome of the transmission, and ck(s) measures the cost associated to using sk.
We assume that the cost scales linearly with the transmit power, and that it is independent of the other
terminal’s strategy: ck(s) = csk/p. Measuring tk(s) is more complicated, as it has to capture the interaction
between the players as a function of the selected strategies s1 and s2. In practice, successful reception of a
signal in a multiple-access scenario (such as the one considered here), be it in the time, frequency, space,
or code domain, depends on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) γk, which measures the ratio
of the useful received signal power to the amount of undesired power collected at the receiver. Under the
assumption of additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with power σ2, we get
γk(s) =
Γhksk
σ2 + h\ks\k
= µk(s\k)sk ≥ 0, (1)
where \k = 2 if k = 1, \k = 1 if k = 2, and Γ ≥ 1 is the processing gain, that depends on the multiple
access technology and on the receiver processing. For the time being, let us assume the transmission to be
successful if and only if γk ≥ γreq, where the minimum SINR γreq depends on some system parameters.
So, when γk < γreq, the transmitted message cannot be decoded at receiver k, and tk(s) = 0. On the
contrary, when γk ≥ γreq, receiver k can correctly receive the information associated to user k’s signal, and
tk(s) = t, where t is a dimensionless parameter that accounts for the throughput achieved at destination.
To properly capture the cost-benefit analysis that regulates any practical wireless system, it makes sense to
assume t≫ c.
A profitable way to investigate finite static games in their strategic form, such as our NFE game, is
through the so-called payoff matrix (Fig. 1b) in which player 1’s strategies are identified by the rows, player
2’s strategies by the columns, and the entries of the matrix (the pair of numbers in the box) represent the
utilities (u1 (s) , u2 (s)) achieved by the players. Under the assumptions that p = σ
2
h1Γ
γreq and h1h2 <
1
1+γreq/Γ
(see [6] for further details), it is easy to fill out each box of the matrix based on the hypotheses listed above.
Once the game is in its strategic form, we have to solve it, i.e., to predict its outcome. In the NFE
game, we assume that both players: i) are rational; ii) control their own strategies only; and iii) know
each other’s payoff. The first assumption means that each player is a utility-maximizer decision maker. The
second hypothesis casts this problem as a noncooperative game, in which the players compete to unilaterally
maximize uk(s). Finally, the third hypothesis involves the concept of complete information that each player
has about the game. By inspecting the payoff matrix in Fig. 1b, it is apparent that player 2’s best strategy
is represented by s⋆2 = p whatever s1 is, since t − c > 0 under the assumption t ≫ c. For this reason, the
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strategy s2 = 0 is said to be strictly dominated by s2 = p, as u2([s1, 0]) < u2([s1, p]) ∀s1 ∈ S1. This is
known to player 1 as well, that rationally chooses to play s⋆1 = 0. As a conclusion, the predictable outcome
of the NFE game is s⋆ = [s⋆1, s
⋆
2] = [0, p], as highlighted by the shaded box in Fig. 1b. In GT parlance, this
game has been solved by applying the iterated elimination of dominated strategies, or iterated dominance
for short [1, Ch. 1].
THE IC GAME
Let us now slightly modify the scenario represented in Fig. 1a. Assume for example to move player 1
closer to its receiver, such that the distance between player 1 and both receivers becomes the same as the
distance between player 2 and both receivers. For simplicity, let us also suppose hjk = h for j, k = 1, 2. By
using p = σ
2
hΓγreq, following the same considerations taken for the NFE game, it is easy to obtain the payoff
matrix reported in Fig. 2. As an exercise, we can verify that no strictly dominated strategies exist, and thus
we cannot apply the iterated dominance procedure used to solve the NFE game.
To get out of this impasse, we introduce the concept of best response (BR) bk(s\k), which is mathemati-
cally defined as:
bk(s\k) = arg max
sk∈Sk
uk
(
[sk, s\k]
)
, (2)
i.e., the best that we can get out of the game once we know the opponents’ moves s\k. Since player 1
chooses rows, we can compute its BR by examining the columns that can be possibly selected by player 2.
When s2 = 0, b1(s2 = 0) = p. Conversely, when s2 = p, b1(s2 = p) = 0. The same can be obtained for
player 2, and we end up with the players’ BRs, underlining the relevant payoffs in Fig. 2. We find two boxes
(shaded background) containing the BRs of both players, representing two stable states, where “stable” here
means that such states are attained by some multiple agents with conflicting interests that compete through
6self-optimization, and eventually reach a point where none of them has any incentive to unilaterally deviate
from.
A point that possesses such properties is termed a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game, defined as a
strategy profile s⋆ = [s⋆k, s
⋆
\k] such that, for all k ∈ K,
uk
(
[s⋆k, s
⋆
\k]
)
≥ uk
(
[sk, s
⋆
\k]
)
∀sk ∈ Sk, (3)
or, equivalently, s⋆k ∈ bk(s⋆\k). As an exercise, check that s⋆ = [0, p] is the unique NE of the NFE game.
The notion of NE encompasses many interpretations of GT, not discussed here for brevity, that the
interested readers can find in many textbooks (e.g., [7, Ch. 1]). Modeling the players as self-optimizing
decision-makers finds a suitable application especially in the context of SP, in which the devices can be
programmed to do so. Since each player has only a partial control of the game, the concept of NE is tightly
coupled with the application of distributed algorithms and machine learning techniques [7, Part II].
For brevity, we will not discuss here theorems on equilibrium existence [1, Ch. 1], that establish the
existence of the NE in particular classes of games, and on equilibrium uniqueness [2, Ch. 3]. When unique-
ness cannot be ensured, like in the case of the IC game, we face the problem of equilibrium selection. One
solution to this issue is the concept of correlated equilibrium (CE) [1, Ch. 2], a generalization of the NE,
where an arbitrator helps the players to correlate their strategies, so as to favor a decision process in the
interplay – e.g., letting them adopt s⋆ = [p, 0].
INTRODUCING CONTINUOUS POWERS
The solutions of NFE and IC games, in which at most one terminal can successfully transmit, directly
stem out of choosing a binary strategy set Sk = {0, p} for both players. Let us see what happens if any
power level in the continuous interval [0, p] can be selected. This amounts to setting Sk = {sk ∈ R :
0 ≤ sk ≤ p}. Within this setting, the power control problem can be studied as a continuous game [7,
Ch. 2]. In our attempt of getting closer to a realistic scenario, let us also modify the utilities to better model
how real data networks work in practice. A good approximation for the effective throughput in a packet-
oriented transmission is tk(s) = t (1− exp{−γk(s)})L [8], whose behavior is depicted (red line, left axis)
in Fig. 3. In our expression,L denotes the number of information bits per packet (here, L = 20), and t is the
communication rate (in b/s). To properly capture the tradeoff between obtaining a satisfactory throughput
and saving transmit power – similarly to what considered for the NFE and IC games –, we will adopt a
“green” approach, based on improving each player’s energy efficiency [8]. This can be done by defining
player k’s utility as the ratio between throughput and power expenditure, thus accounting for the number of
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Fig. 3: Throughput (red) and utility (blue) as functions of the SINR (continuous NFE game).
bits correctly delivered per joule of energy consumed:
uk(s) = tk(s)/sk [b/J], (4)
whose normalized behavior is reported (blue line, right axis) in Fig. 3, with µk(s\k) defined as in (1).
Using straightforward manipulation, player k’s BR (2) turns out to be bk(s\k) = min{p, γ⋆k/µk(s\k)},
where γ⋆k is the “optimal” SINR such that ∂tk(s)/∂γk(s)|γk(s)=γ⋆k =
1
γ⋆k
tk(s)|γk(s)=γ⋆k [8]. For instance,
when L = 20, we get γ⋆k u 4.5 = 6.5 dB for k = 1, 2 (see Fig. 3). Based on such BR, the continuous IC
game presents a unique NE, represented by the fixed point s⋆k = bk(s
⋆
\k) for k = 1, 2 [8].
How can the NE be “visualized”? Let us consider a particular realization of the network sketched in
Fig. 1a, with the following parameters:1 h11 = 0.75, h21 = 0.25, h12 = 0.5, h22 = 1; Γ = 4; p/σ2 = 5;
andL = 20. The solution of this game is given by the NE s⋆/σ2 = [2.99, 1.97], yielding normalized utilities
σ2
t u1(s
⋆) = 0.269 and σ
2
t u2(s
⋆) = 0.407. We display in Fig. 4 the (normalized) utilities at the NE (green
diamond) on the bidimensional normalized utility plane, given by all achievable utility pairs (u1(s), u2(s))
(shaded region), for any strategy profile s ∈ S1 × S2 (the utility plan can be found via a numerical search
using [9]). Note that s⋆1 > s
⋆
2, and u1(s
⋆) < u2(s
⋆): this is due to the better channel conditions experienced
by player 2 (both in the direct and the interference links), that make it achieve the optimal SINR γ⋆2 with
a lower power consumption than player 1. However, unlike the finite version of the NFE game, where
s⋆1 = 0 (and thus t1(s
⋆) = 0), now player 1 can successfully connect to its receiver, getting a throughput
1The MATLAB code for all examples presented in this note is available for download in [9].
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t1(s
⋆) u 0.8t (the same as t2(s⋆)), at the cost of a slightly higher power consumption (s⋆1/s⋆2 u 1.52), and
thus with a lower energy efficiency.
IS THE NE EFFICIENT?
A natural question that arises regards the actual efficiency, or, the performance, if you wish, of the NE.
To address this question, we first need to agree upon our performance metric. In GT, a convenient way to
assess how desirable a solution is involves the concept of efficiency, evaluated in terms of Pareto optimality.
A profile s is Pareto-optimal (PO) if there exists no other s such that i) uk(s) ≥ uk(s) for all k ∈ K, and
ii) uk(s) > uk(s) for some k ∈ K. In our continuous IC game, the performance achieved by the PO profile
set is represented by the contour of the shaded area of Fig. 4, which is called the Pareto frontier. Clearly, if
we increase u1(s) (i.e., if we move rightward along x), then u2(s) decreases, and the same happens if we
increase u2(s) (by moving upward along y). Still, Pareto optimality does not qualify as our performance
metric.
We have to further introduce the notion of social welfare (SW), that is often used as a convenient measure
for the efficiency of a strategy vector [7, Ch. 2]. Formally, the social-optimal (SO) profile sˇ is the PO profile
that maximizes the SW, defined as the weighted sum-utility
∑
k∈Kwkuk(s), where the weights {wk}k∈K,∑
k∈Kwk = 1, allow us to account for different classes of service: as an example, unequal weights can be
useful to model PUs (higherwk’s) and SUs (lower wk’s) in a cognitive network. In our two-player game, we
can identify sˇ as the tangent point between the Pareto frontier and a line with slope−w1/w2. As an example,
9if we consider w1 = w2 = 0.5 (i.e., if the two players have the same priority), sˇ/σ2 = [2.20, 1.55], yielding
σ2
t u1(sˇ) = 0.278 and
σ2
t u2(sˇ) = 0.446 (Fig. 4).
We have zoomed a section of Fig. 4 (see the inset box) to show that the NE s⋆ is socially inefficient, since
its performance is distinct from (more specifically, poorer than) that achieved by sˇ. In general, sˇ cannot be
achieved by distributed algorithms, rather, it is the result of a global optimization, and in our case it turns
out to be unbalanced towards player 2 (the one with better channel conditions): this is reminiscent of the
waterfilling policy [4], that allocates most resources to the users that can achieve higher throughputs. More
importantly, the magnification in Fig. 4 shows that there are a multitude of profiles that provide utilities
lying in the Pareto improvement region, in which uk(s) ≥ uk(s⋆) for all k ∈ K (shaded region in the inset).
Consequently, the next question is: how can we improve the efficiency of the NE? In this lecture note,
we will focus on three popular methods, namely: i) modifying the utility functions; ii) letting the players
interact more than once; and iii) letting the players cooperate.
PRICING THE STRATEGIES
The simplest method to improve the efficiency of the NE while maintaining the game structure is by
modifying the utility function. This can be done for instance by introducing some form of externality. This
approach is in spirit close to mechanism design [1, Ch. 7]. For the power control games studied so far,
one might think of charging the players for the powers they consume, by introducing a pricing factor α
(in b/J · W−1): u˜k(s) = uk(s) − αsk = tk(s)/sk − αsk [10]. The rationale behind this approach is the
following: if each transmitter is discouraged from being aggressive (due to power taxation), the multiple
access interference (MAI) experienced by the other is reduced, and both SINRs at the equilibrium stay as
close as possible to γ⋆k (provided that the AWGN power σ
2 is not dominant – a condition which always
holds in multiple-access systems).
To evaluate the benefits of this method, we compute the NE s˜⋆ of the modified game, using the BR
approach (see [9]). The cyan cross marker in Fig. 4 represents the performance
(
σ2
t u1(s˜
⋆), σ
2
t u2(s˜
⋆)
)
of
the original utility function (4) (which is the one we are actually interested in), using α = 0.12t/σ4, that
yields s˜⋆/σ2 = [2.17, 1.57]. As can be seen, the performance of s˜⋆ is very close to the Pareto frontier, further
favoring player 2’s performance compared to the SW. We have thus improved the efficiency of the game
solution, while maintaining the noncooperative nature of the interplay (with all its desirable properties).
The main drawback is that this improvement can only be achieved after a proper tuning of α (that highly
depends on system parameters). As an exercise, one could evaluate the performance of s˜⋆ as a function of
α (see [9]).
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REPEATING THE GAME
The inefficiency of the NE is mainly due to the selfish behavior (in the sense of self-optimization) of
the players. An effective method to induce cooperation – while maintaining the noncooperative nature of
the interaction – is forcing the players to interact more than once. A typical example of this approach is a
repeated game, in which a static game is repeated N times. For instance, assume that the two transmitters
of Fig. 1a interact a number N of times, each time selecting their optimal transmit powers sk(n), where n
is the time index [11]. When introducing the notion of time, each strategy set Sk becomes a complete plan
of actions, that depends on the unfolding of the game through time.
Similarly, the utility functions must account for i) the partial utilities uk(s(n)) = tk(s(n))/sk(n) received
at each stage n of the game, with s(n) denoting the profile selected by the players at time n; and ii) how
much past utilities should be weighted (i.e., decay) compared to present ones. A simple example is the
exponential decay, where the utility at time n is weighted by the factor δn, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, and the total utility
after N repetitions of the game is uNk (s) =
∑N
n=0 δ
nuk(s(n)). By letting N → ∞, we further define a
normalized utility uδk(s) = (1−δ)
∑+∞
n=0 δ
nuk(s(n)) [11]. The parameter δ is the so-called discount factor,
and its meaning is borrowed from micro-economics: a payoff received at the present time n is larger by a
factor 1/δ than the payoff of the next stage, and smaller by a factor δ than that of the previous one. This
means that, if players are patient (in the SP and communications context, delay-tolerant), δ is typically close
to 1. Conversely, if players are impatient (i.e., delay-sensitive), δ is typically close to 0.
Extending the concept of NE to repeated games [1, Ch. 5], we can show that the optimal strategy sδ =
{sδ(n)}+∞n=0 is for both players to select sδk(n) = sˇk if
(
sδk(n − 1) = sˇk and sδ\k(n − 1) = sˇ\k
)
, and
sδk(n) = s
⋆
k otherwise, with s
δ
k(0) = sˇk, and sˇ and s
⋆ being the SO and NE points, respectively, provided
that δ ≥ δ (i.e., if they are delay-tolerant enough), where δ is a function of the network parameters [11]. In
other words, in the repeated IC game, cooperation is enforced by letting the players interact an indefinite
number of times: this is successful due to threatening future punishments for the player(s) who defect.
The effectiveness of this approach is apparent in Fig. 4, where the performance of sδ , represented by
the black asterisk, coincides with the SW, under the assumption δ ≥ δ. As a drawback, players must have
knowledge of sˇ: this only occurs if each player k knows all channel gains {hjk}j,k∈K, which might not be
viable for all scenarios (e.g., in a cognitive network). Repeated games are a subclass of dynamic games, that
are often used in SP problems to account for time evolution (see [7, Ch. 3] for more details).
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INTRODUCING COOPERATION AMONG THE PLAYERS
In the techniques considered so far, we have focused on improving the efficiency of the solution, without
considering any fairness issue. In the example above, the SW is obtained by favoring player 2 to the
detriment of player 1’s performance, as is apparent in the inset of Fig. 4, where the SW is far away from the
projection of the NE over the Pareto frontier – obtained intersecting it with the “fair” line with slope 1 and
passing through (u1(s⋆), u2(s⋆)). We can balance efficiency and fairness by explicitly introducing cooper-
ation among the players, assuming some explicit exchange of information. The fundamental difference of
a cooperative approach is that, while in the games assumed so far cooperation can only be induced as the
result of matching it with self-optimization (i.e., unilateral deviations are not beneficial anyway), now the
players are willing to cooperate, as they know that they can mutually benefit from reaching an agreement.
In GT parlance, this is called a bargaining problem [2, Ch. 7], whose analytical tools are tightly related to
SP techniques, such as consensus algorithms [12].
Consider again the continuous IC game, and assume that the players can collaborate to select a satisfac-
tory profile s˙ ∈ S1×S2. In case they fail to reach an agreement, each player k gets uk(s⋆), where s⋆ is the NE
of the noncooperative game studied before. On the contrary, the players now strive to attain the Nash bar-
gaining solution (NBS), i.e., the (unique) PO profile that satisfies s˙ = arg maxs∈S
∏2
k=1 (uk(s)− uk(s⋆)),
where the subset S ⊆ S1 × S2 is such that uk(s) ≥ uk(s⋆) for all k ∈ K and s ∈ S. Interestingly, the NBS
has close analogies with proportional fair allocation mechanisms, as discussed in [2, Ch. 7]. As is apparent,
the NBS tries to increase as much as possible the utilities of the players with respect to the NE in a fair
manner.
The graphical interpretation of the NBS is shown in Fig. 4: the NBS s˙ corresponds to the profile such
that (u1(s˙), u2(s˙)) is the point of tangency between the Pareto frontier and the hyperbola with vertex in
x = u1(s
⋆) and y = u2(s⋆). Hence, the point of tangency lies by definition in the Pareto improvement
region, as illustrated in Fig. 4 using a blue dot. In our usual network configuration, s˙/σ2 = [2.26, 1.52],
yieldingσ
2
t u1(s˙) = 0.288 and
σ2
t u2(s˙) = 0.434. The performance of s˙ lies in between the SW and the
maximum-fairness projection of the NE performance, thus trading off efficiency and fairness. The reason
why the NBS is unbalanced towards player 2 lies again in its better channel condition, which makes it
stronger in negotiation [2, Ch. 7].
For more than two players, we can also consider a more general cooperative framework, namely coali-
tional GT [13], that provides the theoretical tools to investigate situations in which subsets of players can
bind agreements to work together, aiming at improving their joint utility. This approach is particularly useful
12
in many areas of SP, such as spectrum sensing for cognitive systems (see [2, Ch. 13] for further details).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this lecture note, we introduced the very basic notions of GT, using a power control problem for a
wireless interference channel as the leitmotiv: by further detailing and adding features to this “toy exam-
ple,” we presented, among the others, the concepts of players, strategies, utilities, NE, Pareto and social
optimality. The interested readers that want to deepen their knowledge of GT are invited to target specific
textbooks, such as general ones (e.g., [1]), and those specifically tailored to an SP audience (e.g., [2], [7]).
REPRODUCIBLE RESEARCH
This lecture note has supplementary, downloadable material available in [9], provided by the authors.
The material includes MATLAB code that can reproduce all the simulation results.
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